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RECENT CASES

where spouses bargain with each other and agree that terms of their contract
shall thereafter define their rights and obligations inter se, then it is to the
contract alone (and to conventional civil proceedings for enforcement of contract rights) that they must look for a remedy in the event of a breach.
While inclusion of such a contract in the decree of divorce may furnish a
basis for subsequent proceedings leading to issuance of a writ of execution, it
cannot support commitment for failure to pay a judgment debt.6
The minority view takes the position that the problem here presented is
not enforcement of an agreement by contempt proceedings, but is rather the
enforcement by contempt proceedings of a decree which has incorporated
therein an agreement. The decree which incorporates an agreement is a
decree of court and the agreement is superseded by that decree. T The obligations thus imposed are not those imposed by contract, but by decree,8 and
are enforceable as suchy
It is submitted that the lawyer attempting to do justice by his client is
presently placed in a confused and bewildered position. What clear cut and
determinative advice can be given to a client when the law is such that
lawyers and judges alike have extreme difficulty in unraveling situations as

that which is presented in the instant case. If incorporation of the agreement into a court decree has no practical effect it should be omitted and
subsequently silence confusion and unnecessary litigation.
W. T. DsLLENnERG.
EXTRADITION -

INTERSTATE

EXTRADrrION -

EXTRADI .IOI'.

OF

NoN-FuceI-

Plaintiff in error was charged in Nebraska with the crime of nonsupport of his wife and children. Nebraska demanded cxtradition under the
federal law. The District Court of Colorado denied the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus after the plaintiff in error had been taken into custody pursuant to the extradition request. The Supreme Court, one justice dissenting,
TivEs. -

held that, since petitioner never lived in Nebraska and his wife left him and
took their children to that state, he was not subject to extradition by Nebraska as a fugitive and was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus discharging
him from custody. Matthews v. People, 314 P.2d 906 (Colo. 1957) .
Extradition, has been established in the several states b' the Constitution!
and the laws of the United States. 3 The Federal Constitution and implement6.

Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d, 310 P.2d 634 (1957);

Dickey v. Dickey.

154 Md. 675, 141 At. 387 (1928); Merritt v. Merritt, 237 N.C. 271, 74 S.E.2d 529

(1953); Stull v. Stull, 126 Pa. 255, 191 At. 187 (1937).
7. Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 94, 14 S.E.2d 681 (1941); Holloway v. Holloway, 130
Ohio 214, 198 N.E. 579 (1935).
8. Compare Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 617, 107 P.2d 249 (1940), with Solomon v. Solomon, 149 Fla. 174, 5 So. 2d 265 (1941) (If merely ratified but not madt.
part of decree, the husband then is not responsible in contempt proceedings).
9. Clubb v. Clubb, 334 Ill.App. 599, 80 N.E.2d 94 (1948).
1. Extradition is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). "The surrender
by one state to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its
own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which being competent
to try and punish him, demands the surrender."
2. U. S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. "A person charged in any state with treason,
felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall
on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to
be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1952).
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ing laws require that the person charged with the crime must be a "fugitive
from justice" before extradition will be granted.4 The cases have strictly conformed to this requirement. 5
The federal law makes no provision for the extradition of non-fugitives who,
nevertheless, have committed criminal acts in other states. This embarrassing gap in the law is best exemplified by State v. Hall,' in which a man in
Tennessee was shot and killed by a man standing on North Carolina soil.
The Hall case ruled out the possible theory of "constructive presence".7
The states have a recognized right to enact legislation td provide for the
extradition of non-fugitives 'charged with a crime in anothei state. 8 Section
6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, passed by a majority of the states
including Colorado, does so provide.O This legislation conflicts with neither
the Federal Constitution nor statutory enactment.1 0
The Colorado Supreme Court, it would seem, has not seen fit to follow Section 6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act." In two cases decided since
its passage in Colorado in 1953, they have refused to uphold extradition attempts of their Governor, basing their decisions on technical grounds. Extradition was denied in both cases because the warrant for arrest and the requisition were predicated on different though not conflicting grounds.'4.

See notes 2 and 3, supra.

5. See, e. g., Kuney v. State, 88 Fla. 354, 102 So. 547 (1924);
N.J. Misc. 488, 21 A.2d 676 (C. P. 1941).
6. 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894).

Ex porte Kelsey, 19

7.
State v. Hall, supra note 6 at 730, "One who has never fled cannot be a fugitive."
8.
Cf. Ex parte Innes, 77 Tex. Crim. 351, 173 S.W. 291 (1915), aff'd 240 U.S. 127
(1916) ".[..
MVe can see no good reason why a state cannot provide for the surrender
of persons charged with crime in a sister state not provided for in the cession to the Federal government or in furtherance of the ceded power."; See State v. Hall, supra note 7
at 731 (dictum)
(the right of the state generally to enact such legislation appears to
have been recognized).
9. For a compilation of uniform laws adopted in the several states see Handbook
Of The National Conference Of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws, 315 (1957); 43
of the states and territories have adopted this Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. North
Dakota has not as yet adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. N.D. Rev. Code
1 29-3002 (1943), sets up the fugitive from justice standard. See Ex parte Quint, 54 N.*
D. 515, 209 N.W. 1006 (1926); Ex parte Galbreath, 24 N.D. 582, 139 N.W. 1050
(1913).
10.
See State ex rel. Gildar v. Kriss, 191 Md. 588, 62 A.2d 568 (1948); People ex
rel. Hollander v. Britt, 195 Misc. 722, 92 N.Y.S.2d 662, (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 93
N.Y.S.2d 704 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 4th Dep't.) (memo opinion) (1949); Culbertson v.
Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E.2d 807 (1942) (upheld the state statute authorizing
the extradition of non-fugitives); Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Crim. 302, 227 P.2d 680
(1951)
(Granted extradition even though the petitioner never set foot in the demanding
state); Ex parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 207, 194 P.2d 800, 804 (1948)
(dictum)
(provisions of the Uniform Act were not unconstitutional as conflicting with the United
States Const. or § 3182 of 18 U.S.C.); Ex parte Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 128 P.2d 338,
343 (1942)
(dictum) (an asylum state can surrender a fugitive on terms less exacting
than those imposed by the act of Congress); Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va. 557, 29 S.E.2d
245, 248 (1944)
(dictum) (upheld a state statute authorizing the extradition of persons
charged with intentional crimes in other states but who were not fugitives).
11.
See Colo, Sess. Laws 1953, c. 117, § 6, "Extradition of Persons Not Present in
Demanding State at Time of Commission of Crime.-The Governor of this state may also
surrender, on demand of the Executive Authority of any other state, any person in this
state charged in such other state in the manner provided in Section 3 with committing an
act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose
Executive Authority is making the demand and the provisions of this act not otherwise
inconsistent, shall apply to such case, even though the accused was not in that state at the
time of the commission of the crime and has not fled therefrom."
12.
In the instant case, the basis of the demand was the Constitution and the laws of
the United States but the warrant issued by the Governor of the asylum state was based
on the Colorado statute authorizing extradition of non-fugitives. See also Stobie v. Barger, 129 Colo. 211, 268 P.2d 409 (1954), here the extradition request was predicated
on the Colorado statute and the warrant was imued on the basis of the United States
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The obvious purpose of Section 6 of the Uniform Act is to supplement the
federal constitutional grounds for extradition and thereby provide a complete system for the extradition of criminals. It is this writer's belief that the
Colorado Supreme Court has failed to realize and to follow the spirit of the
law. It is further submitted that the need for uniformity of interpretation of
Section 6 of this Uniform Act is essential since these proceedings necessarily
involve two states.
RODNEY S. WEBB.
INJUNCTION -

NATURE

AND

FORM

OF REMEDY -

DiFENjANT

REQUIRED TO

DECREE. - The District Court enjoined the defendant from using and maintaining certain premises described in the State's complaint, or any other premises within the
County, for purposes of lewdness, assignation or prostitution, and called. upon
her to give a bond in the sum of $5,000 conditioned upon her compliance
with the terms of the decree. On appeal the Supreme Court of New Mexico,
one judge dissenting regarding the bond requirement, held that the order
and the bond requirement be sustained in so far as they related to the premises described in the complaint. State v. Robertson, 31:3 P.2d 342 (N.M.
1957).
The act enjoined in the above case is a crime;' it constitutes a public
nuisance per se which is enjoinable with or without a statute expressly authorizing injunctive proceedings. 2 However, neither statutory provision nor judicial precedent has been found to support the requirement of a bond conditioned on compliance with an injunction. 3
The New Mexico Supreme Court advanced but two cases to support its
sustainment of the bond requirement: City of Roswell v. Jacoby4 and State
ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court.5 The former case involved the question of
the legality of a municipal ordinance which required a bond of apothecaries
who would sell spirits, and which provided for forfeiture of the bond upon
conviction of a breach of the provisions of the ordinance pertaining to spirits.6
If this case is analagous to the principal case, it is no morc than tenously so.
State ex rel. Martin v. Superior Court was cited as support for the proposition that the requiring of a bond is a valid exercise of the discretion, inherent in equity's broad powers, in providing the means for the enforcement
of the injunction.7 The pertinent portion of the case cited reads that, "...
POST BOND

CONDITIONED ON CONFORMANCE WITH

THE

Constitution. Both cases were decided upon the reasoning set out in the Stobie case, supra
at 410, "(T]he warrant issued is not in accordance with the requisition; consequently it
is wholly ineffectual for any purpose."
Contra, Ex parte Oxford, 157 Tix. Crim. 512,
249 S.W.2d 917 (1955) (extradition was authorized even though there was a technical
discrepancy in the grounds relied upon.).
1. N. M. Stats. Ann. § 40-34-1 to 40-34-5 (1953); N. D. Rev. Code § 12-2214
(1943).
2. State v. Ellis, 201 Ala. 295, 78 So. 71 (1918); State v. Gilbert, 129 Minn. 95,
147 N.W. 953 (1914). N. D. Rev. Code § 12-2214 declares that the utilization of any
structure' or conveyance for the purpose, of prostitution constitutes a common nuisance.
3. In this regard the dissenting justice observed, "I have tried to find in the books
authority justifying the requirement that the defendant post this bond, but have failed."
4. 21 N.M. 702, 158 Pac. 419 '(1915).
5. 101 Wash. 81, 172 Pac. 257 (1918)
6. It was held that the bond requirement of the ordinance was invalid in that the
forfeiture provision was penal in design; had the ordinance provided that the bond constitute a contract for liquidated damages, it would have been valid, said the court.
7. See 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence 21 (13th ed. 1886) "... one of the most
striking and distinctive features of Couits of Equity is that they can adapt their decrees
to all the varieties of circumstances' which mduy arise ..

